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✹
Prelude to Armageddon
Michael J. Gerhardt

T

he nation finds itself in a rare replacement is likely to be as intense as any
moment of calm before the storm. Supreme Court appointment in our hisOn July 1, Justice Sandra Day tory. Her resignation gives President Bush
O’Connor surprisingly announced her inten- the opportunity to shift the Court’s center
tion to resign upon the nomination and con- further to the right, particularly in criminal
firmation of her successor. The announce- procedure, establishment clause, and gender
ment caught everyone off guard, including discrimination cases. Given the expectation
not only her sons but also the White House. that the Chief Justice will resign sooner rathThe prevailing wisdom at the time was that er than later (and maybe in a matter of days
if anyone were to resign from the Court at or weeks), President Bush seems well posithe end of the 2004 Term it would be the tioned and prepared to transform the Court,
Chief Justice of the United States, William a possibility that is not good news to most
Rehnquist, who has been ailing with thy- Democrats.
roid cancer. Justice O’Connor’s announceThough the stakes in replacing Justice
ment signaled the first vacancy on the Court O’Connor are not lost on anyone, not everysince 1994, the year in which the Senate con- one in the Senate can claim the same familfirmed Justice Stephen Breyer’s nomination iarity with the Supreme Court confirmation
to replace Harry Blackmun on the Court. As process. A majority of senators – 56 – have
such, her announcement marks the begin- never participated in a Supreme Court conning of the end of the longest period in more firmation; fewer than half the members of
than two hundred years without a vacancy the Judiciary Committee have any experiarising on the Court. Since Justice O’Connor ence in dealing with the confirmation of a
has been the swing vote in a number of criti- Supreme Court nominee.1 Senate staffers
cal cases in recent years, the fight over her are using the brief period of calm between
Mike Gerhardt is the Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of North
Carolina School of Law.
1 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Out of Practice, Senate Crams for Battle Over Court Nominee, N.Y. Times,
July 8, 2005, A1, 20.
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the announcement of O’Connor’s resignation and hearings on the President’s choice
to replace her to educate themselves (and
their bosses) about the confirmation process,
including its history.
I suspect that, but for the Green Bag, it
would have been highly unlikely any but a
few people would have known about, much
less had the opportunity to read the transcript of, a special hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers held in
1976. The hearing, whose transcript follows,
focused on the often-ignored role of the Senate to provide “Advice” on Supreme Court
appointments.2
The hearing is particularly interesting
when one contrasts it with another Senate
subcommittee hearing held 25 years later.
Both hearings were led by Senate Democrats – James Abourezk of South Dakota in
1976, and Charles Schumer of New York in
2001. Senator Abourezk held his hearings in
the brief interlude between Justice Douglas’s
announced resignation from the Court and
President Ford’s nomination of then-Seventh Circuit Judge John Paul Stevens as an
Associate Justice, while Senator Schumer
conducted his hearings without the raison
d’etre of a Supreme Court vacancy.
The most striking difference between the
hearings, at least in my judgment, has little
to do with their timing. I am most struck by
the difference in their focus. In 1976, the experts primarily focused on qualifications. In
the 2001 subcommittee hearing, the focus
was principally on “ideology.” In 1976, the
experts acknowledged that judicial philosophy was something presidents, and senators,
might consider. But they did not consider it
their role to either validate or attack particular judicial philosophies, and the term “ideol2

ogy” appears nowhere in the hearing. Instead,
the experts and the senators questioning
them all looked for higher ground, a higher
ground on which politics of the highest order would play a recognized part. In 1976, the
witnesses discussed the characteristics essential to someone meriting appointment to
the Court. Judicial philosophy received scant
mention, and no particular ideology was
labeled as either obligatory or disqualifying
for the candidate who would replace Justice
Douglas. In 2001, the experts recognized it as
inevitable, if not necessary, for confirmation
proceedings to focus on judicial nominees’
likely ideologies.
Yet another interesting difference between the 1976 and 2001 hearings is that the
Separation of Powers subcommittee – and
the experts – tended to focus on different
parts of the Appointments Clause, which
provides that the President “shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint … Judges of
the supreme Court … .” In 1976, the express
purpose of the subcommittee hearing was
to explicate the term “Advice,” while in 2001
the subcommittee’s focus was on the extent
to which the “Advice and Consent” power
empowered the Senate to evaluate nominees’
judicial philosophies.
What accounts for the quite different
focuses in 1976 and 2001? No doubt, some
conservatives, or Republicans, will be quick
to blame the Democrats for the change in
focus in judicial confirmation hearings. On
the one hand, many blame Jimmy Carter,
who would not become president until January of the next year, for trying to stack the
lower courts with liberal activists under the
guise of diversifying the federal judiciary. On
the other hand, many point to the Senate’s

Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution states that the President “shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for.”
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rejection of Robert Bork’s nomination to make “political” appointments to the Court
the Court as a watershed event in the Su- – that they would make Supreme Court appreme Court appointments process. They pointments to further their social or political
argue that it was the Democrats who in agendas. But the experts did not offer com1987 changed the rules (indeed, some argue mentary on those agendas and the Senators
the Democrats did this again in 2002 when questioning them sought none. Rather, the
they started to filibuster some of President experts all saw their task as trying to provide
Bush’s judicial nominations). As many Re- counsel to the Senate on how it may provide
publican commentators see it, ideology was “Advice” to the President to appoint the “best”
never, or almost never, an important factor in possible person to the Court. Accordingly,
Supreme Court confirmation hearings un- they went to great lengths to set forth what
til Senate Democrats made it so. I am sure they each considered to be the indicia of a
many commentators will thus greet the 1976 meritorious appointment to the Court.
hearings, conducted by Democrats, as proof
So, who is to blame for an apparent change
positive of the absence of ideology as a focus in the focus of Supreme Court confirmation
of Supreme Court confirmation hearings if hearings? Who is right? I will let you, the
not the Democrats’ apparent culpability in good reader, decide. I will not try to sway you
shifting the focus toward ideology.
one way or other (even if that were possible).
Democrats have a few interesting re- Instead, I will make just three observations
sponses. Many will no doubt argue that it for further consideration. The first is to conwas President Reagan and the Presidents sider the significance of the 1976 subcommitBush who began to emphasize ideology in tee’s attempt to construe the powers of the
their nominations to both the lower feder- Senate over Supreme Court nominations. In
al courts and the Supreme Court and thus particular, the senators and experts agreed
forced the Senate to consider its propriety in that the term “Advice” in the Appointments
judicial selection. Bork was not a watershed Clause empowers the Senate to make nonso much as the culmination of a systematic binding recommendations to the President
effort by the Republicans to stack the courts on the criteria he ought to employ in selectagainst Roe v. Wade3 and other decisions of ing Supreme Court nominees. For anyone
both the Warren and Burger Courts. Once who claims to be a textualist (and that ought
Democrats regained control of the Senate in to be all of us!), each word of the constitu1986, they had the opportunity to keep Presi- tional text is supposed to have meaning, and
dent Reagan from replacing a swing justice so the word “Advice” in the Appointments
– Lewis Powell – with someone clearly dis- Clause ought to have a distinct meaning, one
posed to undo or alter Powell’s legacy. The that it is separate from the term “Consent” in
1976 hearing helped to make their point: the same clause. The question, of course, is
Held three years after Roe, it is noteworthy what is that special meaning. Regardless of
that in the hearing that Roe is mentioned one’s politics, one ought to recognize that the
only once, and even then only obliquely and term “Advice” raises the possibility of some
not by name. (Try to imagine a Supreme pre-nomination role that the Senate may perCourt confirmation hearing in 2005 in which form in Supreme Court selection and more
Roe is mentioned a single time!) In 1976, the generally in the federal appointments proexperts all anticipated that presidents would cess. It is hardly silly for senators to look for
3

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

F ro m Th e B a g  Su m m e r 2 0 0 5 

401

M i c h a e l J. G e r h a rd t
this meaning, though it is not uncommon in
our history for senators from the President’s
party to construe the term “Advice” narrowly
to allow the chief executive more discretion
in choosing nominees and senators from the
opposing party to construe the term broadly
to oblige the President to consider more seriously their recommendations for important
nominations.
A second, important observation is that,
in trying to determine the possible differences between the 1976 and 2001 hearings, we
have the advantage of knowing how things
turned out. By this, I do not mean Bork’s rejection. I mean Stevens’ nomination, and particularly how President Ford employed what
many commentators, then and later, consider
as a model for appointing a Supreme Court
justice. After setting forth some basic criteria (including judicial philosophy), President
Ford delegated the primary responsibility for
assembling a short-list to his very able Attorney General, Edward Levi. Attorney General
Levi did a first-rate job. In keeping with his
efforts then to restore confidence in the Justice Department in the aftermath of Watergate and President Nixon’s resignation, Levi
worked hard to find the best possible nominee. That the nominee he found was someone whom he knew and who came from the
very same city in which he had spent most of
his professional life may have been a coincidence. The Senate greeted the nomination of
John Paul Stevens with great relief and acclamation. He was easily confirmed; and while
some may argue he has drifted (disturbingly)
to the left (or that the President should have
stressed judicial philosophy more heavily in his choice of a nominee), John Paul
Stevens has been, I believe, a model justice.
He is by all accounts a person of enormous
integrity, high intellect, principle (albeit nuanced), civility, grace, and independence. Ask
yourself how willing you would be, operat-
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ing behind the infamous Rawlesian veil of
ignorance without any idea of what cases
might come before the Court including your
own, to accept a Justice Stevens. I for one
have no trouble accepting him as the judge
of my case without even knowing what the
issues would be, for I am confident that, as
his record shows, he will listen carefully to
the arguments of both sides, and that he will
not pre-judge the cases coming before him
but instead will fairly and even-handedly decide them on their facts and the law as he
has found it. He has been as considerate as
possible of all legitimate sources of decision.
Not bad, for a justice, I think. He might not
have been the “public” person the experts in
1976 urged the President to select, but he has,
I think by almost any measure, served his
country (and its Constitution) well.
Third, of course, we also know how much
ideology has become the preoccupation with
those responsible both for choosing and for
confirming justices. I believe this has been
a bipartisan preoccupation, for better or
worse. And, while I am not confident it is a
good thing, it has been a preoccupation with
most presidents and most senators. It is no
accident that at the times of their respective appointments to the Court all eleven of
President Washington’s Supreme Court appointees were well-known Federalists, that
all five of President Lincoln’s Supreme Court
appointees had been ardent supporters of
the Union, and that all nine of President
Roosevelt’s appointees had long track records of supporting the constitutionality of
the New Deal.
The contemporary challenge is to determine whether it is possible to define merit in
non-ideological terms. The 1976 hearing is
remarkable, because the experts did just that.
I do not know how many experts could do
that now. The 1976 hearing thus provides a
significant marker for us. We can measure
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how far we have come or perhaps how much holds. It is, however, not too late to learn from
we have deviated from its underlying assump- an interesting moment in our history, though
tions and expressed understandings. Instead I leave it to each reader to decide what lesof blaming any decline in the appointments son our past, including the hearing, teaches
process on others, perhaps we can ask how us about the Supreme Court, the President’s
much President Bush and the Senate is each nominating authority, the Senate’s authority
capable of rising to the occasion as I believe to provide “Advice,” and of course the Rethe President and Senate did in 1976 to join publicans’, Democrats’, and countless interest
in making a genuinely meritorious appoint- groups’ agendas. If things do not work out
ment.
as we like, I agree with Shakespeare that the
It would be folly to predict what the future fault does not lie in the stars.

•
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